Netroots Rising

The following interview with Sen. Jim Webb was completed on June 21, 2007.

Feld: How much of a role, and in what ways, did the “draft” play in your decision to enter the US Senate race?
Webb: Seeing the spontaneous enthusiasm of the “draft” movement was a very strong motivator for me, particularly as one who had never run for office, and would be running as a Democrat after having served in the Reagan Administration.

Feld: When you started your campaign, you seemed very interested in running a Howard Dean-style, netroots/grassroots-oriented campaign. Do you think that’s what ended up happening? If not, why not?
Webb: To the extent that it was possible given the incredible time constraints in a campaign that was begun only 9 months before the election, with no money and no campaign staff, I believe we did accomplish that goal.

Feld: Do you believe you would you have won the primary without the netroots and grassroots support that you got? How about the general election?
Webb: This is a difficult question to answer, as there are so many dynamics in play in an election campaign. But it would not have been possible to get the word out regarding the campaign, particularly during the primary, without this support. And the true turning point in the general campaign was the Tim Russert debate, after which we received around $150,000 in unsolicited internet contributions within 24 hours.

Feld: What were the main contributions the netroots and grassroots made to your campaign? Were there any downsides to having the netroots and grassroots so heavily involved?
Webb: My campaign was truly a bottom-up endeavor. It relied very heavily on volunteers, word of mouth, and netroots / grassroots in order to build support. Of particular value was the quick-response reactions to character assassination and the misrepresentation of my views, both of which were emblematic features of the Karl Rove campaign formula.

Feld: How do you see the role of the netroots developing in 2007, 2008 and beyond? Do you believe the netroots/grassroots model will ever displace traditional ways of running political campaigns?
Webb: I do continue to believe that this is an evolutionary aspect of campaigns. At its best, this approach represents participatory democracy in its finest form. At its worst, it offers trouble-makers to engage in anonymous personal attacks.

Jon Henke was George Allen’s netroots coordinator and currently is a manager at New Media Strategies in Arlington, Virginia. This interview was completed on April 25, 2007.

Feld: What do you think were the most significant elements that came together to produce such a strong grassroots/netroots movement for Jim Webb?

Henke: I believe the dominant factor in the strong netroots performance on the left was the fact that Democrats have been out of power for so long. The base was able to put aside ideological differences because they had a single, unifying frustration: Republicans. And the solution to that frustration was more practical than ideological: get Democrats of any stripe elected.

When Democrats have held power for awhile, ideological differences will become more important to the Democratic base; in the meantime, the Netroots are more worried about how to storm the castle than how to govern it.

Feld: How would you describe the grassroots/netroots movement for George Allen?

Henke: George Allen had a small cadre of supportive bloggers, but there was not a “grassroots/netroots movement”. The campaign didn’t do anything to develop a movement in advance, and by the time the importance of the new media became apparent – mid-to-late August — the only option left was to hire somebody to engage bloggers and spread the campaign message within the new media. That is when and where I came in.

Feld: What do you think were the greatest successes and greatest failures of the “Draft” and the grassroots/netroots Webb movement in general?

Henke: I believe that Webb netroots team did a very good job selling Jim Webb as an electable candidate with a real chance of winning. Rallying the national netroots around his campaign did a great deal to enhance his stature in the media and with potential donors. The LeftRoots was also very successful at surrogating the Webb campaign and DNC oppo research to the media.

Feld: How valuable/effective do you believe the pro-Webb blogs and online groups were.

Henke: I’ll just quote something I wrote at QandO.net:

Make no mistake, without the netroots, Webb would not have won. He may not even have been close. It was a long-cultivated activism/outreach/media-hounding New Media campaign that brought Webb to the attention of the institutional Democrats, sold him to the activists and shaped the narratives of both Webb and Allen for the media.

Feld: Same question for the Allen campaign.

Henke: The Allen campaign had only done minimal outreach to the blogosphere and had never really integrated blogs into its messaging, communications and strategy before late August. In the final couple months, I believe we were much more aware of the problems and better capable of addressing them within the same medium….but by that point, the narrative was set and we were forced to play defense until the end.

Feld: Do you believe that the Democrats “got” the power of the netroots better than the Republicans in 2006? Or not?

Henke: I believe the Democrats “got” the Netroots in 2006, while Republicans did not get it at all. In 2007, Republicans are just now at the same place Democrats were in late 2002/early 2003: they know this whole “new media” thing is important and they know they should try to figure it out, but it’s still a bit of a mystery to most of them. It will take some time for the establishment to grow comfortable with the new communications medium.

Feld: The Allen campaign got a relatively late start on its blogging/netroots strategy. Why do you think this was the case, and do you think it hurt the Allen campaign?

Henke: Why? I’m really not sure why the Allen campaign didn’t have a blog/netroots strategy prior to September of ’06. Perhaps they thought it wasn’t necessary. The problem was not that they missed the opportunity to develop a pro-Allen netroots movement; the problem was that they missed the events occurring in the Leftosphere – the developing narrative — which would have tipped them to the coming storm and how to deal with it.

Feld: All in all, despite the fact that Virginia continues to be a Republican-leaning state, the number of pro-Democratic blogs is greater than the number of pro-Republican blogs. Why do you think this is the case? Also, how would you describe the quality and effectiveness of each side’s blogging efforts in both 2005 and 2006?

Henke: I think pro-Democratic blogs outnumber pro-Republican blogs almost everywhere, regardless of the hue of the State. Democrats have a much more developed new media operation, and the liberal/progressive movement throws more resources at their new media effort. However, in Virginia, as in much of the country, it’s simply a matter of Democrats being out of power, frustrated and in search of new venues for their voice. Democrats gravitated to blogs for the same reason that Republicans gravitated to talk radio and Free Republic in the 90s. It gave them a place to shout – a place to get involved.

Feld: Do you believe that senior Allen strategists like Dick Wadhams were surprised at the intensity of the Virginia blogosphere? Did anyone ever say to Wadhams, “Dick, I don’t think we’re in South Dakota anymore!”

Henke: I think virtually all Republicans were surprised at the effectiveness of the Democrats internet media machine. I suspect that a few years of apparent impotence had lulled them into the belief that the LeftRoots movement was just the “fringe crazies”. That misses the real power and influence of the liberal blogs, in my opinion, which is much more in narrative development and messaging to the influentials than about fundraising and GOTV.

Feld: Do you feel that the pro-Allen blogs on balance helped the Allen campaign, hurt it, or had no effect? Same question for the pro-Webb blogs.

Henke:I think the campaign blog (AllenHQ) was relatively effective in the short time it existed at drawing attention from the national Rightosphere and at pushing some issues to the attention of journalists. Most of our new media successes were behind the scenes, or things nobody would ever really know about.

I believe that, on balance, the pro-Webb blogs were successful. By the time we were able to push back, criticize and draw attention to some of the pro-Webb blog excesses and inaccuracies, the damage had been done. And as ‘feeder blogs’ working information up to the national blogs, they were always successful because the Democrats have a relatively coherent activist new media operation.

Feld: What were you guys thinking after the “Macaca” video started going viral? Did you know that this would be a huge story that could do great damage to the Allen candidacy?

ANSWER: I didn’t enter the campaign until a bit more than 2 weeks after that happened. I don’t think they thought the incident would be as big as it was – again, understandably, they missed the narrative being developed in the blogosphere – and were genuinely surprised that people thought it was somehow racial in nature. The “racism” angle played up by Democrats was very much at odds with the man they knew, so I think they were surprised that people believed that.

However, since the ‘macaca’ interpretation was consistent with the narrative that the Leftosphere had worked to develop over a long period, it was easier for the Leftosphere to frame it as they did.

Feld: The relationship between campaign bloggers’ past writings has come up numerous times, including most recently with Amanda Marcotte and Melissa McEwan on the Edwards campaign. Do you think that bloggers will be able to operate effectively within political campaigns given the constraints on saying anything “controversial?” Also, do campaign bloggers need to share the candidates’ views and style of expression in order for the relationship to work? In your case, for instance, your libertarian beliefs appeared to conflict at times with George Allen’s stances on several issues.

Henke: In many respects, bloggers will be viewed just like any other campaign employee, and campaigns should be just as careful with the blogger they hire as they are with, for example, the deputy spokesman they hire.

Bloggers should be able to operate effectively within campaigns, so long as both the campaigns and the bloggers understand the both the limitations and proper role of a campaign blogger and/or netroots coordinator. Obviously, restrictions on the ability to be overtly snarky and controversial will limit the effectiveness of the blogger qua blogger. However, unlike regular bloggers, the role of a campaign blogger is not really to be an opinion leader.

I think bloggers will want to share the political views of their candidate in a very general sense, but it’s absurd to think that any campaign employee would agree 100% with the candidate on all issues.

In my case, I believed that George Allen was good on many issues that were important to me, and that he was orders of magnitude more acceptable than Jim Webb whose economic tendencies – e.g., opposition to free trade, gross misunderstanding of income issues – were diametrically opposed to my political priorities.

Feld: In general, how do you see the role of the netroots, the blogosphere, and “new media” evolving in coming years? How do you see this impacting the traditional media, consultant-dominated, top-down campaign structure?

Henke: The New Media will grow more professionalized and coordinated in coming years. That will disappoint some fans of the early “amateurs in the new frontier” atmosphere, and I sympathize with that. I also sympathize with people who miss the days of small-town Mom and Pop stores, but evolutions take place because people find better ways of doing things. In the blogosphere, as on Main Street, some will develop more effective ways to find and deliver content.

Of course, there will always be a place for the amateur blogger who can get good information and write with a unique voice. For the political world, this represents a new battlefield for the minds of voters and Influentials, and they’ll need to figure out how to engage it both in the short term (campaigns, political offices) and in the long term (Parties, interest groups and movements). The New Media won’t eliminate the traditional media, political consultants or the top-down campaign structure…but it does help democratize the game.

Feld: Maybe the blogosphere will evolve on two tracks?

Henke: Actually, that’s a good point. I think the “professionalized” track will take over a lot of the muckraking, gotcha, aggregation and information-dispersion, while punditry will be split between hobbyists and professional journalists/pundits/etc. There will probably never be a professionalization of the “cranky independent” or “nonpartisan” punditry zone – who profits? – so you’ll end up with a lot of good, indy/hobbyist bloggers there.

Feld: I remain puzzled at the lack of urgency and seriousness on the part of the Allen campaign with regard to the blogosphere.

Henke: …They probably didn’t realize the political winds were shifting, and underestimated the Leftosphere. My impression is that the early failure of the Leftosphere to win races, combined with the over-the-top rhetoric had made the establishment believe that the Leftosphere was more of a “far left fringe” that was (a) generally incapable of turning out voters, and (b) making the Party look bad.

I think the first assumption is correct – the blogosphere doesn’t really GOTV. That’s not its function, though. The latter assumption was probably incorrect, because the vast majority of the public didn’t know/care about the overheated rhetoric that sometimes occurred/occurs in the ‘sphere. However, they failed to understand that blogs are very effective at framing things for the Influentials, and that’s where they lost track of progress being made in the Leftosphere.

Right after the “Confederate Prick” story came out, I sent an email to somebody at the Allen campaign, suggesting they think about how to deal with that narrative and fast, because it was very clear that the Left/Webb/DNC people were busy building a ‘racism’ narrative against Allen and if the Allen camp didn’t address it soon, it would be too late when they had it built. It was a bit depressing to see them ignore what seemed so apparent to somebody who paid attention to the blogosphere, understood how the “progressive infrastructure” worked and how it saw narrative development/framing/etc.

Feld: As to the pro-Allen blogs, I’d actually say they hurt Allen’s campaign rather than having no effect.

Henke: Perhaps. I try to distinguish between the tiny pro-Allen bloggers and the AllenHQ blog. I agree that they were, er, inexpert.

Feld: I think their attacks at the end on Jim Webb’s writings backfired badly.

Henke: That entire episode was a relentless embarrassment. I don’t know if you noticed at the time, but I never criticized Webb for writing what he did. I had zero problem with it, and thought it should have been a total non-issue. What I DID write was that (a) it’s not “unfair” to reproduce work Webb has published and cited as part of his resume as a politician, and (b) a lot of Democrats previously argued that such sex-fiction was bad. (I referenced the criticisms made of Scooter Libby, Olbermann saying a Democrat would have their head on a pike if they wrote something similar, Shakespeare’s Sister arguing that Libby’s book indicated how sickness he really was, etc)

I’ll stand by those two, narrow statements. However, I don’t agree in the least that his writings were ‘bad’ or relevant to the campaign. And the over-the-top way some people argued that, I agree, may have been detrimental.

The following interview was conducted with Steve Jarding on April 12, 2007. Steve was senior strategist to the Jim Webb for Senate campaign and is currently managing Sen. Tim Johnson’s reelection campaign in South Dakota. Steve is also the co-author of Foxes in the Henhouse: How the Republicans Stole the South and the Heartland and What the Democrats Must Do to Run ‘em Out”.

Feld: What were the most significant elements that came together to produce such a strong grassroots/netroots movement for Jim Webb? Were the netroots always part of your strategy for electing Jim Webb?

Jarding: The netroots existed, had some juice, had some experience. With the netroots, there was an infrastructure (Webb didn’t have any money, organization or connections with the party). Webb told me that the netroots guys were pushing him pretty hard to run. It was a motivated group, seemed loyal, enthusiastic. People said the netroots will never work with the establishment or professional campaign. We embraced the netroots early [in an attitude of] mutual respect. Webb wanted to run an unconventional campaign, in part because he didn’t want to spend 5-6 hours per day raising money. Webb was a good messenger for an unconventional campaign. The netroots, in part, allowed him to be a different kind of candidate. Jim knew his strengths and weaknesses. At the end of the day, it worked. The netroots was a security blanket for Jim.

I was aware that the conventional wisdom was don’t trust these guys, they’re not party people. Warner approached Webb in the summer but Webb didn’t know at that time. Late in 2005, Harris Miller was going around telling people that Webb wasn’t running. I thought that Webb could win. I talked to Bob Kerrey, said that Allen’s gonna be tough but the right Democrat can beat him. The netroots was always part of the strategy. What the netroots brought to the table was very refreshing, not unlike Jim Webb himself.

For instance, if it wasn’t for the netroots packing Gerry Connolly’s St. Patrick’s Day Party, Webb might not have won the primary. That was the first piece of evidence that there was something there, 10 days after Webb’s official announcement. It was the first concrete moment in the campaign, and it was mainly because of the netroots. The victory was reported in the Washington Post.

The netroots moved stories before the MSM did. For instance, the Jewish heritage story, Macaca, the “n” word. The tail was wagging the dog. At Harvard, I now give as much attention in my class to the netroots as to opposition research.

Feld: Why did the netroots rally behind Webb?

Jarding: The Iraq war, and Webb’s early opposition to that war, may have been a catalyst to get people to consider Webb. Also, one of the things I like about the netroots is that they’re not encumbered by the status quo, by conventional wisdom. They can think outside the box. They saw the potential in Webb.

Feld: Other impact of the netroots early on?

Jarding: The netroots didn’t necessarily get people like Chap Petersen and Leslie Byrne [to endorse Webb], but the netroots gave them a bit more cover. Those people endorsed Webb for their own reasons, maybe calculated. The netroots may have helped open the door to people like Chap, [Arlington Revenue Commissioner] Ingrid [Morroy], other electeds with whom we had relationships. We had some credibility with these people. It all kind of builds. At some level, there’s a connection, it’s all tied together.

The netroots got Jim really thinking about running. In November 2005, Webb and I got together. Webb knew that the netroots were pushing him to run. The amount of money pledged in the draft may not have seemed like a lot, but it was credible enough; another sign that this wasn’t unreal.

Feld: What was your thinking in hiring Josh Chernila and me to be grassroots and netroots coodinator, respectively, on the campaign?

Jarding: We were rolling the dice a bit bringing in Josh and you. The main risk was in losing Josh’s and you independence to do what you were doing. Hiring you guys was the institutionalization of the netroots into a modern campaign. Some party folks, particularly in Virginia, saw you guys as a threat, wanted to knock you out after the primary. My argument was let’s bring ‘em in house, because we haven’t fully utilized them. I wanted to raise $1 million online, and we ended up blowing that away. The party people didn’t know who the netroots were, felt threatened. The Virginia party folks were more threatened than the national party people. The decision to bring in Josh and you was a source of some angst, dissension for some party people who saw the netroots taking credit for Webb’s primary victory. Some party people denied that the netroots had anything to do with it. Maybe they were jealous because the netroots were getting a lot of buzz, publicity? A lot of campaigns might have said, “let’s cut the cord.” But we stuck with them. Of course, we made the right choice bringing in the netroots. It goes back to day #1.

Feld: Any comment on the tensions between the campaign and the netroots?

Jarding: This campaign doesn’t get enough credit. We could have cut loose the netroots, but we decided we needed them and that we would work together. This synergistic relationship occurred not by accident. We had to learn to trust each other, stay focused on the prize. There was a lull after the primary, we were broke. We decided that the netroots and “top down” were on the same team, we’re gonna ignore the sniping. There was no room for error. The truth is that we had no money, almost lost the campaign HQ.

We saw that we needed the netroots, as difficult as some of them were. The campaign was able to go to the netroots in a synergistic relationship, they would build crowds and get people to events. People saw there was energy, passion.

Feld: How would you describe the netroots in general?

Jarding: Its empowering. It’s people reading, writing, making decisions for themselves. The corporatization of the media has…opened up space for the blogs. We’re bombarded by information…you can get your news from a million sources, not like in the old days with Walter Cronkite. Today, our government is broken, taken over by lobbyists. People are hurting out there. People feel a little helpless, angry, insecure. All of a sudden there’s a forum for them to express themselves, get involved, give money and time, get active. I can’t think of another technology with this much potential. Raw, immediate medium. Individuals making decisions.

Feld: Are we in a transitional era?

Jarding: Yes, the netroots is here to stay. Other media have competition from the blogs. The blogs are unfiltered, they can be dangerous. This is the greatest democratic movement technologically maybe ever. When have we ever had the capacity for millions of popel to get involved, give money? Now there’s a way to get active.

It used to be that whoever spent the most money won, but now that’s not necessarily the case. If a campaign uses the netroots properly, you can reach a lot of people that way. A lot of traditional entities have become stagnant. This netroots is fresh. You don’t have to work your way up the ranks, entry costs are low. The previous model will adapt, disintegrate, and coopt. Someone will put together a business model to make money off the blogs. It’s the ultimate compliment (”imitation is the sincerest form of flattery”).

Feld: Thoughts on the 2007/2008 presidential cycle and the netroots?

Jarding; Part of Obama’s early success is attributable to the netroots. Republicans have their institutional ways to reach people (e.g., talk radio). Blogs rushed into a vacuum on the Democratic side. The question is how big will this get?

…This is a powerful technology, the potential is phenomenal. In 1 or 2 cycles, you’re not going to have a campaign where blogging is not instrumental. Netroots combines media, research, organizing, ideas exchange, fundraising. Media shops in campaigns are reaching out to the netroots. Such a powerful tool. This is a way to move people, reach a mass audience almost free of charge.

[...]

Where’s all the new money coming from? The netroots. This transitional era is a tsunami. But there’s no formula for bringing bloggers onto campaigns. It’s walking a fine line - intellectual freedom vs. control.

Lee Diamond is a long-time Democratic and progressive activist who, In January 2006, co-founded the Draft James Webb movement. Diamond was crucial to the success of the “draft,” and also played a central role in getting the Webb campaign off the ground during its first few months. Diamond had never blogged prior to the Draft James Webb experience, and considers himself more of a grassroots than a netroots person.

Feld: What do you think were the most significant elements that came together to produce such a strong grassroots/netroots movement for Jim Webb?

Diamond: There are at least two big aspects to this:

1. The sophistication of our initial group: technology, where to blog, knowledge of local politics, knowledge of the local grassroots network, and our connections in the blog world and the political world.

2. The deep well of grassroots energy for Democratic victories that continues up to this moment as evidenced by Obama’s and Clinton’s fundraising totals. This resulted from Democratic losses in terribly run campaigns, Bush venality on almost everyday basis, governing a divided country like he had the biggest mandate in modern times, the emergence of IT as an incredible force (first with MoveOn, then McCain, Meetup, Dean, etc). On Bush, Cheney venality, I’d like to pay special attention to the way they used fear to manipulate the public and start a war that continues to devastate Iraq and kill innocent children among others. This makes me incredibly angry and depressed. I am quite sure that this made a lot of my friends as angry as or even angrier than me. I did channel it into something positive with our campaign to elect Jim Webb.

Feld: What do you think were the greatest successes and greatest failures of the “Draft” and the grassroots/netroots Webb movement in general?

Diamond: We won. We built [Webb] a bridge to the Democratic Party. We cut the path. We knocked down the trees. We held his place for him. We also innovated all year long, from Draft Webb to Real Virginians For Webb. Our looseness was a virtue in the way great people came in and were accepted for the skills and contributions they brought.

I don’t at this moment see any failures…The danger of grassroots is that it cannot be controlled or it is difficult to control. That is why bottom up makes politicians nervous. (I think it played some role in undermining the Dean campaign, although the candidate made some serious mistakes and it is hard to know what would have happened had Dean not made his mistakes.)

The Webb campaign was all about grassroots from the very beginning…The reason it was a grassroots campaign was because of the grassroots, not the top-down. Everything came from the grassroots…all the initiative, people like Mary Detweiler, Jan Lars Mueller, etc. Webb is Senator today because of the grassroots.

Feld: How valuable/effective do you believe the grassroots pro-Webb blogs and Yahoo groups were?

Diamond: Early on they made our organizing much more effective. Susan Mariner came to our attention because of Raising Kaine or another blog. This area is a great example of how online meshed with traditional shoe leather organizing. It was synergistic. Later, of course, it became a means of sharing info with a somewhat larger segment of the population.

There should be something about the website as well. This was not a blog, but it was the key to our initial organizing. It kind of made everything else we did possible. We could email the link to our friends (in addition to blogging) and get the viral thing going. While I did not blog at this point, I probably knew the largest number of activists and I emailed everyone I know and some of those folks became part of our volunteer corps. Others helped spread the word.

Feld: How would you describe the meeting between the “bottom up” draft and the “top-down” professional campaign people after Jim Webb announced? Specifically, how do you believe the grassroots/netroots was integrated - or not - with the “professional” campaign.

Diamond: Ultimately, integration did occur. Walking into the field office in the fall after not having been around for some time was a Rip Van Winkle experience. I very much suspect, however, that it happened because of Josh [Chernila] and people such as Mary Detweiler and Sarah John. Harriet [Hirsch] is another one, but a lot of people came in after I left and so I cannot speak so much to their roles. I met a number of terrific people in late fall, election night and after the election.

Volunteers were crucial to the campaign throughout, but at times their presence was sort of invisible.

Feld: Why do you think the Webb campaign achieved the success that it did, in contrast to the Clark and Dean campaigns, both of which ultimately lost.

Diamond: This was a statewide race so it was immediately a manageable thing for us to undertake. The areas we worked in initially were the areas that won the primary for us. We had a candidate who was compelling before he said a word in public. This goes to both the candidate and the climate at the time. It goes to his disillusionment with the Republicans on the war (because that is what we knew about when we started) and the truly awesome force of personality he brings to the table. It is like firepower. It is like a coiled spring ready to smash someone standing nearby.

Feld: What lessons should the netroots learn from the Webb experience?

Diamond: Grassroots activists should continue to work on participatory leadership models. We should spread skill development, knowledge, etc so that we can exercise greater discipline while having people involved and understanding what is going on. It seems that progress is being made on this score in Virginia.

Feld: What did you do exactly during your time on the campaign?

Diamond: My position was volunteer coordinator. I coordinated the search for office space, obtaining furniture, recruiting volunteers to help us with all that. I coordinated the early petition drive and later helped Pete D’Alessandro. I staffed events, organized phoning when we had only 4-6 phone lines, built crowds.

One of the most significant things I did was serve as the fallback for our petition drive. I went out for a week to coordinate…obtaining the lion’s share of our signatures in the three districts in the western part of the state. In Blacksburg and C-ville, I ran into paid Miller workers. Of course, Pete and I were the only people the Webb campaign paid to work on the petition drive. We had hundreds of volunteers doing this tiresome, grinding work for us. It made us a lot stronger as an organization and as individual activists. We showed what we could do.

Feld: To what extent did you take action on your own initiative?

Diamond: Of course, with the Draft most of what I did was on my own initiative.

Jim announced on February 8. I fronted the money for a table at [the state JJ dinner]. I pushed for him to go and for him to have extensive contact with his grassroots supporters during that time period. We had some success with this. His appearances at DFA and PDA , local parties, etc. who I networked with was quite important in getting us over the hump of resistance from some people. Kate Wilder and others initially had questions. I was the one who answered those concerns.

I facilitated the initial petition drive which other people obviously ended up taking an enormous role in.

I had a very hard time with this initiative question during the campaign because the previous campaigns I’d been involved in were kind of command and control, top down operations.

I eventually encouraged people to go ahead and work some of the City Council elections held in 18 jurisdictions around the state on May 2, 2006. I sent out the professional grip cards to some folks around the state despite [the campaign] declining my requests to support this effort with campaign resources.

Feld: Anything else you think is important, interesting, funny, relevant?

Diamond:…it was a deeply moving experience to be part of something so important. We did deliver the Democratic majority in the Senate because WE put a race in play that was totally unanticipated. Not only did we put it in play, we won! We destroyed the Republican plan for ’06.

We also took out an expected Presidential candidate…