John Hlinko: Draft Clark “wasn’t just a Little Rascals episode”
In early 2003, John Hlinko founded the Draft Wesley Clark movement. Lowell met John 5 years and 1 day ago at a Clark “Meetup” at Stetson’s in Washington, DC. The following interview with John was completed on April 2, 2007.
Feld: What do you think were the most significant elements that came together to produce such a strong grassroots/netroots movement for Wes Clark?
Hlinko: Back in early 2003, President Bush was still relatively high in the polls, in the 50s or 60s. This created a lot of angst among Democratic activists. There was a real sense that without the right candidate, we were going to see another Bush victory. And, with the rush to war with Iraq, the Patriot Act, etc., there was an equally real sense that the stakes were higher than they had been in years, if not decades.
In a post 9/11 world, it was clear that the “right candidate” would have to be someone with unquestionable credentials on national defense. I think that while a lot of the Democrats running already could’ve made great presidents, and while a lot of them certainly were strong on defense, realistically it was hard for any of them to appear as strong in the eyes of the electorate as a 4-star General.
So I think there was a strong demand among activists for someone with General Clark’s credentials, and a large swath of the Democratic base was positively predisposed to flock to him once they were made aware of him.
And that’s where the draft came in – providing a platform for making the potential supporters aware of General Clark, and specifically, giving the media a reason to cover and showcase him. And that part was absolutely critical –a well thought out, well carried out draft effort was critical to getting media coverage for General Clark, and thus giving positively predisposed potential supporters a chance to get to know him in the first place. There is absolutely no doubt that his media coverage and name recognition jumped significantly with the launch and progression of the draft.
And I think that’s probably the most misunderstood part of the draft Clark effort – way too many folks thought that this was solely an “Internet” effort. But the reality is that it didn’t succeed because we got tens of thousands of email addresses in a database, it succeeded because we got tens of millions of people to see news coverage of it on CNN, ABC, NBC, etc. If this had been solely an Internet effort, and if there had not been significant media coverage, it would’ve failed like so many other aborted draft efforts.
Also, I think it’s critical that people recognize this wasn’t just a spontaneous outpouring of people on the net. It wasn’t just a Little Rascals episode where the kids all get together on the spur of the moment to build a new playhouse and it just somehow magically comes together. It was a serious campaign conducted by a heck of a lot of very serious, talented, creative, hardworking people. Without those people putting in a heck of a lot of time – the draft would have failed as well.
Feld: What do you think were the greatest successes and greatest failures of the “Draft” and the grassroots/netroots Clark movement in general?
Hlinko: In the short term, for the Clark effort specifically, I think the greatest successes were:
* The enormous amount of media coverage. Per my previous point, I think 100% that that is what drove the draft, and made it work.
* Raising $2mm in pledges for a potential campaign. That was a huge shot in the arm, financially, when the campaign started.
* Taking General Clark from about 1% in the Democratic polls when we launched, to first place at announcement time.
* The MeetUps: We had people meeting in over 100 cities, and had the second largest MeetUp group of all (behind only Dean) — without a candidate. That’s pretty astonishing.
Beyond the campaign itself, however, I think the effort’s biggest success was in inspiring and empowering tons of its participants to go on to join and launch other efforts, including drafts. I mean, look at how many drafts there were (and are) this year. It’s astonishing.
In terms of failure, I think the biggest one is that we didn’t actually elect our candidate. Net net, I think the draft itself was an enormous success – we convinced our candidate to run, and we let him do it with an enormous amount of money pledged, media coverage and buzz, and people power. The draft – getting him to run – succeeded beyond our wildest expectations. Obviously the campaign itself, unfortunately, did not work out as well.
Feld: How valuable do you believe the Yahoo groups were? What about all the grassroots pro-Clark websites?
Hlinko: Well, I think the pro-Clark web sites were absolutely critical, and I would argue that DraftWesleyClark.com in particular was the most important. I don’t mean this in an egotistical way – this wasn’t a one-man show, there was a whole team behind it. But I do think 100% that media coverage was the most critical thing, and between the radio ad, TV ads, and pledges, we were the ones that drove the vast bulk of that coverage.
Early on, I think that DraftClark.com, and DailyKos (before Kos joined Dean) were extremely important in energizing the netroots, and getting other blogs and major media to cover us and the other efforts. I also think that the Yahoo group was a great, easy means of letting the most enthusiastic supporters swap ideas, encourage each other, and come up with plans for building more and more buzz. DraftClark2004 deserves credit, I think, for coming up with some great looking materials (signs and such), and frankly, even though we butted heads (DWC and DC2004) during the process, the competition spurred us both to work that much harder.
Finally, the MeetUp site was of course incredibly important. Getting all those people meeting in real life not only generated enthusiasm, it provided opportunities for media coverage (especially local) of the draft movement, and made that movement look as big as possible.
Feld: How would you describe the meeting between the “bottom up” draft and the “top-down” professional campaign people after Wes Clark announced? Do you believe the grassroots/netroots was well integrated - or not - with the “professional” campaign.
Hlinko: I think there were certainly good folks and not so good folks on both sides of the fence, but the net reality was that the grassroots was not well integrated at all. Members who joined the campaign were able to do tactical stuff, but that was about it. It was pretty clear from almost day one that we were not going to be playing any kind of strategic role, regardless of what success we’d had up to that point.
I don’t think this was necessarily a result of anything nefarious, though, or any kind of grand conspiracy against the grassroots. No doubt, there were people who viewed us as a hindrance, and who tried to shove us to the side due to their own selfish interests – even though it hurt the campaign. Mostly, however, I think it stemmed from two things in particular:
* This was a new paradigm altogether – there never had been a presidential campaign in history that started with tens of thousands of working volunteers, and millions of dollars in pledges. There simply was no rulebook for how to integrate that movement. For example, there was a lot of uncertainty as to where the grassroots stood legally – could they spend money, once the campaign announced? Who were the leaders at the state and local levels? New hires, or the grassroots people who’d been doing it for months? The answers were not always clear, and unfortunately the campaign lost precious time and momentum while trying to figure those answers out;
* No campaign manager – for the first few months, we had no campaign manager (aside from Donnie, briefly, at the beginning). For the life of me, I still can’t understand why this was the case. It was probably the most surreal thing about the campaign – a campaign without a campaign manager. But as a result, it was unclear who was actually in charge, what the chains of authority were, etc. There were multiple people whose titles indicated they might possibly be in charge, but no campaign manager.
Feld: Do you believe that there were some people among the “professionals,” like Donny Fowler, who “got it” with regard to the grassroots/netroots? If so, why did they get it while others didn’t? What and who do you think were the biggest obstacles to full integration and utilization of the “Draft” in the Clark campaign?
Hlinko: Yes, I do believe there were certainly professionals who got it, and Donnie was right at the top. He clearly understood the power, and really “got” the technology that would be needed to make it work at peak efficiency. I still remember him talking in 2003 about using Treos in the field for real time data collection, analysis, etc. I think he also got the importance of keeping the movement fun, keeping an insurgent flavor, etc.
There were some others, unfortunately, who totally did not get it, nor did they have any desire to figure it out. I think part of it is a natural tendency in any campaign – the first thing someone does when they join the team is immediately discount the achievements of all those who went before them. There are always two sides to every story, of course, and God knows we had our share of difficult people on the grassroots as well. But overall, I think a lot more of the grassroots folks were willing to work collaboratively with the professionals than vice-versa. And as a result, we lost a lot of momentum in those early, critical weeks – the time when the momentum mattered the most.
Feld: Any key turning points, for instance Donny Fowler’s resignation?
Hlinko: Yes, Donnie leaving was a big turning point for sure. It was troublesome on the one hand, because he had been campaign manager and yet did not ever appear to really have clear authority. So his leaving (as opposed to really getting power) seemed to imply that the unclear leadership situation would continue. And, given that he was a champion of the grassroots/netroots, it seemed a sign that we would not be playing a serious leadership role.
Another turning point, in my opinion, was actually the announcement itself. The draft groups really didn’t play any part. We were not among the speakers that day, we were barely mentioned in the speech, and we weren’t even in the audience in the background. I don’t think anyone expected a starring role, of course, but it was kind of weird to be almost invisible after working 6 months to make that day happen. And I think it was an early sign of just how little some key people in the campaign really valued the grassroots.
Feld: Did you hear the story about Eli Segal pounding his fist on the table and yelling, “THIS WILL BE A TOP-DOWN CAMPAIGN…GET THESE GRASSROOTS RABBLE OUTTA HERE!” Or something like that. Do you believe that summarizes the attitude of people who also supposedly said they had been “doing this since McGovern” and would quit if Gen. Clark let the “Draft” people give him advice?
Hlinko: I had heard stories like that about a few of the folks, but did not see it myself. To be honest, it would seem a little out of character for Eli. God knows we had our differences, but I liked Eli. And he struck me more as a straightforward guy who would’ve been straightforward with such a sentiment.
One trend I did notice, however, was that the professionals who had the most impressive records seemed to be the most cordial and cooperative with the grassroots, while the ones who had the least impressive records (i.e., loss after loss) seemed the most likely to treat us with disdain.
Feld: Was the tension between the grassroots and the “professionals” merely a typical campaign power struggle, or was it indicative of the professionals’ failure to understand the benefits a strong grassroots/netroots movement could bring?
Hlinko: Probably a bit of both, I would think. My sense is that this kind of thing happens in every campaign, though I couldn’t speak personally to that. I think in this one it was worse because of the lack of a real campaign manager. But I do think that some of the professionals had no clue about the benefits that the grassroots had already brought, and could continue to bring. Again, it was a new paradigm for a campaign. And as with any new paradigm, there will always be some who learn about it and succeed with it – and others who stubbornly cling to the paradigm they’ve been using, even if it’s completely outdated.
We showed up with tens of thousands of volunteers, $2 million in pledges, an astonishing amount of media coverage, and more momentum than any of the declared candidates. And yet, some of the professionals seemed to think we had nothing of value.
Feld: Was the “Draft” at fault in any way for the ultimate failure to integrate with the campaign? What lessons should the netroots learn from the Clark experience?
Hlinko: I think we in the draft hurt ourselves because there was some divisiveness among the grassroots, and we were more easily viewed as troublesome, to be ignored, etc. We also had some personalities in the group who were frankly extremely difficult, and needlessly alienated others.
But the biggest lesson I think we learned – never, ever, ever assume that the “professionals” are necessarily more competent until they prove so. A long resume is not something to be impressed by, a lot resume of success IS. In retrospect, I wish we (and me personally) had pushed back a lot harder against some of early decisions that seemed wrong, and ultimately did turn out to hurt the campaign greatly.
Feld: Do you believe that a “draft” movement such as with Wes Clark could have happened in the pre-internet era?
Hlinko: No way. There was simply no way pre-Internet to recruit, engage, and mobilize so many citizens so quickly, at such a low cost. And without those numbers, there would’ve been far less media coverage, and much, much less of a chance of success.
Feld: Do you agree that the netroots are rising in power and influence, that citizens are gaining increased access to their Democracy again, and that the power of the “top-down media model” is waning?
Hlinko: I agree, for the most part. But I don’t think it’s necessarily about citizens gaining increased access. I think it’s about all of them having the potential to impact their democracy – but very few of them actually take that opportunity. I don’t think it’s about empowering hundreds of millions of Americans, but rather empowering hundreds of thousands of highly competent, creative, savvy grassroots leaders – who now have the power to rally far, far more people than ever before.
In the same way that the rise of the blogs gave the chance for every good writer to compete directly with those in the magazines, papers, etc., the rise of the net in general gave citizen leaders the ability to compete on an equal footing with the “professionals.”
Feld: Was Jim Webb’s netroots-fueled victory in 2006 a fluke, or was it a sign of broader trends and possibly more to come? Why did the Webb campaign succeed in 2006, while the Clark did not succeed in 2003/2004?
Hlinko: I can’t claim to be an expert on that race, but from everything I saw, it certainly appeared that without the netroots, there’s no way Senator Webb would have won, or possibly even run at all. The draft effort certainly made it more inviting for him to run, and the blogs and netroots were critical in getting him a ton of attention – and of course in spreading the word about Senator Allen’s macaca moment.
I do think it’s very much a sign of things to come. Specifically, voters will never have an excuse again to whine and bitch about “bad candidates,” because someone else (like me or you) can turn to them and say, “yeah, then shut the hell up and draft someone you DO like.” Grassroots activists really do now “have the power” to do that.
Tags: John Hlinko, Meetup, Wesley Clark