Harris Miller’s Campaign Manager on the Webb-Miller Race
Andrew Resnick was Harris Miller’s campaign manager during the Webb-Miller Democratic primary of 2006. The following interview was completed on April 12, 2007.
Feld: What do you think were the most significant elements that came together to produce such a strong grassroots/netroots movement for Jim Webb in 2006?
Resnick: I think that 2006 was a very unique year in politics and with Jim Webb, you almost had the perfect storm. In terms of the grassroots/netroots there were clearly three elements that drove its strength. 1) the war and Webb’s position as a veteran and former Sec. of Navy against the war from the start; 2) the incredibly low approval ratings and mistrust of the Bush Adminstration and the GOP, mostly because of the war — and an incumbent who was never shy about his allegiance to Bush, especially when it came to the war; and 3) a sense of ownership by the netroots/grassroots in Jim Webb as a candidate — I think it was mostly the sense of ownership, that a movement got him to run and now is carrying him through the race that made it such a strong movement.
Feld: Why did a strong grassroots/netroots movement NOT come together for Harris Miller?
Resnick: Two factors. 1) the war and Jim Webb’s bio — you could run anyone against Jim Webb in that race and a medal receiving veteran and former Sec. of Navy is going to have the upper hand when 2006 was clearly all about the war in Iraq. 2) the sense of ownership — most of the netroots got behind him in the beginning because of his bio and it carried through the primary. All the other excuses and attacks on Harris throughout the primary, as reasons for not garnering enough netroots support is crap, both candidates had records that were questionable to Democrats and both and a lot of the same positions — what it came down to was Webb’s bio and the sense of ownership a lot of the netroots felt in his candidacy.
Feld: Why was there such opposition to Harris Miller’s candidacy on the Virginia and national progressive blogs? Was it ideological, a feeling that only Webb could beat George Allen, hostility to the Democratic “establishment” by the netroots, or what?
Resnick: I honestly don’t think it was ideological — if you look strictly from an analytical perspective Miller’s’ positions on most issues were more in line with the Democratic base. I think to a certain extent the “establishment part had something to do with it as most of the netroots try to portray an “outsider” image, but in actuality by the end of that race that nat’l democratic endorsements took away the outsider image of Webb (at least in the primary). But, I still think you have to go back to the same two factors as before: the sense ownership of his candidacy by the netroots; and his bio when 2006 was all about the war in Iraq (I think his bio and the war makes the electability argument valid as well)
Feld: From your perspective as Miller’s campaign manager, as you were watching the Miller-Webb campaign unfold, were you concerned with what you were seeing with regard to volunteers and netroots presence by thetwo candidates?
Resnick: The Netroots was a concern in terms of their increasing ability to push stories, true or untrue, into the news cycle and reporters increasing willingness to pull stories from blogs. Northern Virginia in particular, it was alarming to see the intensity factor of Webb’s volunteers. Looking back on that race, I think we certainly took those aspects for granted — but I will always be confident in saying that we ran the campaign planned to run. In terms of volunteers throughout the rest of the state, actually no i wasn’t alarmed. Downstate, especially in Richmond and the Chesapeake area, we had a good army of volunteers who were canvassing for us (yes, led by teams of paid canvassers) and phone banking for us. It just never translated into rallies and good visuals for the campaign b/c it wasn’t in NOVA.
Feld: What do you think were the greatest successes and greatest failures of the “Draft” and the grassroots/netroots Webb movement in general?
Resnick: Success was again the organizing ability and the intensity factor that came along with it, and the ability to push stories into the media (ie, Macaca) that eventually led to the downfall of Allen.
I think one overiding and continuing failure (and I hope this can change for the betterment of netroots in general) is the consistent attitude of “what we say is the final word and everyone else is wrong” — I think too many bloggers had that attitude and were too quick to jump down the throats of those who differed - especially when both sides of any campaign do the same thing (in the primary and the general). I think the netroots will be better served once more participants realize that politics, or really campaigns, has to be approached as a game — a zero sum game at that. Somebody wins and somebody goes home on election day and your whole purpose until then is to out do the other candidate so you’re the one standing in the end. Its like one big chess match constantly trying to outmanuver each other. Both sides do the same thing (primary, dem v. rep v. indp. v. green — whoever the candidate) because everyone is trying to win.
Feld: Specifically, do you believe that the netroots was what helped overcome the 3:1 spending advantage that Harris Miller had over Jim Webb?
Resnick: I think when you look at Northern Virginia was what won the race for Webb and thats were the netroots seemed to be the strongest, you can’t ignore that factor. It was certainly NOT the only factor, but it has to be in the discussion.
Feld: A related question: can you comment on the fact that Jim Webb won where the netroots was strongest, while Harris Miller won where the netroots was weakest? Was this just a coincidence?
Resnick: No, it definitely wasn’t coincidence, but again, you can’t ignore that fact. If you look at the numbers, Webb won by carrying NOVA. Something he did partly because of the organizing power of the netroots in that region, but more importantly because of the free media from the national endorsements.
If you look at the rest of the state minus NOVA, Miller won by around the same margin as Webb won overall. Looking from the inside of the Miller campaign, with all the national endorsements in the end, that makes perfect sense. We combined our mail and phones with network tv buys in every major media market of the state except for Nova (it was just too expensive). In NOVA we had a cable buy, but a very limited one at that based on the structure of the cable companies and what they allow political campaigns to do. When Webb’s national endorsements came in, we were successfully able to shift the story from “Webb wins nat’l Dems, delivers knockout punch to Miller campaign” to “Webb and nat’l Dems vs. Miller and VA Dems in Senate Primary”, but we couldn’t stop the continuous amount of free press he received from it — and specifically in Nova where the DC mentality is strong and people pay attention to that stuff more than in other parts of the state, and where we were not up on network tv to combat it. And of course, Nova delivered the knockout punch for Webb.
Feld: Do you believe that the rise of the netroots will continue in 2007 and 2008, and if so, how will it manifest itself (e.g., a decline inthe power of the political consultants and top-down media model?).
Resnick: I think the netroots will certainly continue to rise just because the use of the internet and the way campaigns are beginning to use it. It will certainly be exciting to see what happens in 2008. With this said though, I don’t think the netroots can be applied the same to every campaign/candidate. I think in order for it work the best you need a candidate that fits a certain mold — for example I don’t see HRC or Joe Biden becoming the darling of the netroots in 08 because they are seen as the old establishment, but look at Obama, look at Edwards, they are challenging the establishment and making this into a generational debate — something the netroots can capitalize on (much the same way Dean did on 04 and McCain did in 00). To the contrary, whats unique about the internet in campaigns is that a candidate can also mold their use of the internet to fit them. 2007 will be interesting, because I’m not sure how the netroots will work in legislative races where the districts are much smaller and compacted, but the netroots much more spread out — it will certainly be interesting to watch.
I definitely don’t think that the netroots will manifest itself into a replacement for the political consultants and the top-down model. We’re, to the contrary, already seeing their integration into that world, especially on the presidential and senate campaigns. Most campaigns now have a “Director of New Media”, a blogmaster, an online outreach coordinator, etc and bloggers are capitalizing on it by becoming consultants and collecting consultant fees — its just the natural progression to evolve into that sytem. Therefore, I don’t think the top-down model will ever be replaced. No matter what a campaign says about them being a grassroots movement, or a bottom up campaign, message and policy is still driven by polls and focus groups, and decisions will still be made by a top group of in order to keep the campaign going — unfortunately.