Donnie Fowler, Jr. on the Clark Campaign, the “Draft Clark” movement, and the Netroots as a “wild, raging river”
Donnie Fowler, Jr. was Wes Clark’s first campaign manager, in September 2003. He is the son of former (DNC) Chairman and legendary South Carolina Democratic political operative Donald Fowler. The younger Fowler left the Clark campaign on October 7, 2003, after a power struggle with Eli Segal and other campaign insiders, in part over the role of the “Draft” movement and the “netroots” more broadly.
Feld: How were the two major Clark draft movements integrated into the formal, top-down Clark campaign structure?
Fowler: General Clark always embraced the [Draft] movement and always appreciated the movement. In many ways, General Clark would not have been able to do what he did out of the gate without the netroots. without the two draft movements and their creativity and their commitment. The day he announced, he did not have a headquarters, a campaign manager, even a checking account. Literally, what he had was his background, his charisma, and these two draft movements. While…[there was a] huge boom when he actually said he was going to run, underneath it there was truly nothing, no infrastructure whatsoever except for the virtual infrastructure that the draft movements created.
Also happening at that time was that Howard Dean was becoming ascendant. Still, to this day, a tremendous amount of the DC party establishment rejects Howard Dean, largely for what he represents, which is a loss of power and influence that they had traditionally had over the Democratic Party. So, at the same time Dean was ascendent in September 2003, Kerry, Edwards, Gephardt, Lieberman were crashing. They were running out of money by November 2003, weren’t even paying their staff, Kerry even had to mortgage his house.
Feld: It was either Dean who a lot of people felt was not electable or someone else….it looked like Dean was gonna win the nomination.
Fowler: It looked like [Dean would win] until right after New Years. The ascendence of Howard Dean in the summer of ‘03 and the fall of all of the other candidates almost simultaneously created a huge vacuum for this [Draft Clark movement]…for a lot of Democrats who were looking for an alternative to Howard Dean all around the country, but in particular a group of establishment Democrats in Washington, many of whom had made a lot of the bad decisions during the Gore campaign in 2000.
Feld: How were the netroots accepted?
Fowler: Gen. Clark always embraced the netroots, understood their power, what they had done for him and what they were capable of doing for him, and he always respected them. But as soon as he announced [for President], he had to go on the road so he wasn’t in Little Rock. For a large number of people like me who…I’m a field guy, grassroots guy, that’s where I come from in the party…this notion of a new flavor of grassroots was compelling. Clark rose so quickly, cover of Newsweek, #1 in a couple of the national polls in just 10 days [after his announcement], it was extraordinary. Then he had this group of people who really rejected the [netroots] movement, outright. They were largely DC establishment types who had been senior in the Clinton Administration, in the Gore campaign…Clark asked me to be the campaign manager the evening of his announcement.
There was a tremendous amount of excitement all around the country, including among some of the traditional campaign people. Very smartly on General Clark’s behalf, he picked Eli Segal to be the chairman of the campaign. Eli flew down about a week later, a couple days after the announcement. I said, here’s the campaign structure I recommend. I had a separate line on the flow chart for the netroots, for the Draft movement, the online movement. Eli’s response was “I don’t understand, they should be on the finance team.”
Feld: He saw it as all money.
Fowler: That is the way Washington viewed it because they saw what Dean was capable of doing and what John McCain had done four years earlier. There was just a fundamental lack of understanding of what this movement was and they were wholesale rejected.
Feld: Did anyone try to explain it to Eli?
Fowler: I did, I did, and so did the leaders of the two draft movements. But: a) they didn’t understand; and b) they wanted control of the campaign, I don’t just mean Eli there were 3 or 4 others. It was an absolute wholesale rejection [by the campaign professionals of the netroots movement]. I heard comments like “they’re a bunch of kooks,” “Donnie, how do you have the patience to deal with them, they’re crazy,” “Why were they a separate line item?”, “Why were they not in the fundraising department, that’s all they’re good for?”
Feld: Was any of this caused by the draft movements themselves?
Fowler: I had to mediate between the two draft movements because they were competitive with each other. There was competition, good competition and bad competition but nonetheless there was competition. They were jealous of who got to do what, who was gonna get a title and who wasn’t, typical politics, there’s nothing unusual about that it’s just part of the job. The sentiment from the netroots movement was this was our child and we feel like there are all these people coming and taking our child away from us, Maya [Israel] said that. It was a perfect statement of the way they felt. They legitimately and rightly felt that they had created Wesley Clark. They had found this marvelously charismatic guy with a wonderful record, Rhodes Scholar, etc. and they had truly created a buzz and a movement around him. Then, when you had to formalize the campaign, take it from this sort of fly-by-night, super-creative but unanswerable to anyone movement and you had structure it, they felt that as Maya said they were taking away our child, a very understandable feeling. Immediately, they had a suspicion, just like a lot of the netroots movement continues to, a suspicion of anyone coming from Washington. So, that also probably made it easier for the establishment people to flat out reject the movement. Because the movement was sort of….hostile. They were very explicit about it in some ways.
…there was just an absolute wholesale rejection. It was just “they’re a bunch of kooks, the only thing they’re good for is raising money, why do you even bother to deal with them?” Part of the whole Democratic Party problem is that they reject the grassroots, and the netroots is one part of grassroots, they reject grassroots campaigning in general.
Several of that half dozen group did have a financial interest. Some had no financial interest, they just didn’t understand. They were suspcisiou of what it was, of loose cannnons, young and unknown, I’ve never worked with these people before. There was a lot of fear, a lot of ignorance…both are cousins of course….and prejudice.
General Clark always appreciated [the netroots], but General Clark on the road was not in Little Rock to manage this situation, nor should a candidate have ever managed a situation like that, it’s not the candidate’s job.
Feld: Is it the candidate’s job to generally set the overall tone an say, “look, this WILL be a grassroots campaign, if I see that it’s not, you guys are in trouble.”
Fowler: What Gen. Clark decided; there were a lot of people with impressive resumes who were calling him and offering to help. If there are talented people and you don’t have a role for them, bring them in anyway and find a role for them. Being someone who had NEVER run for office was ultimately the downfall of the campaign, not whether the netroots was intregrated or not, not what happened to Dean or any other candidate. He didn’t have any perspective (e.g., “when I ran for governor, when I was in the US Senate”). He simply decided that some of these people had exceptionally impressive resumes so they should be running the campaign.
Feld: Did you guys have a sit-down serious meeting about how to deal with this massive Clark movement.
Fowler: Every day, every day, several times a day. Personally, I spent hours and hours with the two draft movements, asking them to be patient, and assuring them that as long as I had anything to say about it, they would be a fundamental senior staff part of the campaign. And I had meetings with all of the other people who came in, both for good reasons and the “bandwagon hoppers.’ I said, you have to understand what these guys can do for General Clark. You also have to understand that they created a candidate that is not a blue-suit politician. And if you pull General Clark to a blue-suit politician and away from this organic, up from the grassroots candidate, fresh-faced, fresh ideas, you’re going to ruin his chance. Just another anti-Dean.
Feld: That was the goose that laid the golden egg right there.
Fowler: It was, very much so! The draft movement spent hours and hours talking to the bandwagon hoppers. I spent hours and hours with the draft movement, asking and begging for their patience and trust. Also, trying to explain why they needed to be an essential part of the senior staff at every table.
Feld: What was the result of all these meetings?
Fowler: What he had was a large set of troops who were highly motivated but unstructured. It was like a guerilla army. What Clark had to create was a functioning professional army.
Feld: Jim Webb talks with pride about his “rag-tag army…” Was there a turning point in the Clark campaign with the netroots?
Fowler: I left because I believed that General Clark had conceded the campaign to the blue-suit establishment, and that the battle was lost…[Also], the decision for General Clark not to compete in Iowa was a decision that typified a disdain for local people, people who live in the states, and a belief that if you live in Washington you know everything that there is to know, you don’t have to ask a lot of questions. The decision to avoid Iowa was made without talking to anyone IN Iowa. For example, Senator Harkin called me after I left the campaign and asked, “Why did the campaign decide not to play in Iowa?” I said, didn’t [make that decision], did someone call you? He said “no,” but thought Clark could have finished first or second. Nobody knows Iowa better than Sen. Harkin. There was just this sense [among the Washington insiders] that they knew better, they didn’t need to ask…
The dismissal of the netroots was really just an example of a much larger dismissiveness, arrogance….it’s frankly why Howard Dean is the chairman of the DNC, because their arrogance defeated them. The DC folks after the 2004 election were very clear that they were gonna pick the next chairman of the DNC and it was gonna be somebody that they knew from Washington. Howard Dean never asked their permission to run for Chairman…Dean is now doing the 50-state strategy, hallelujah praise the lord. It’s still there, the dismissiveness, the arrogance, this at the end of the day was why the netroots was rejected. It wasn’t ONLY about the netroots, it wasn’t only about the internet, it wasn’t only about new technology. It was a broader disease that still curses a lot of the Democratic Party - not as much as it used to.
Feld: Inside the Beltwayism?
Fowler: It’s an attitude of, “If it’s not in the Washington Post or on Meet the Press, it’s not important”. All of the country from DC looks monolithic [to these people]. Iowa looks the same as Texas, Texas looks the same as California. If you view the country as “one size fits all,” then your strategy will be “one size fits all.”
Feld: Where was Wes Clark in all this? I would be pissed if I found out I wasn’t going to be competing in Iowa after I promised I would compete everywhere.
Fowler: Clark’s inability to win was because he had never been a politician before. When people said, General, I know you said you’d compete in every state, but here’s the argument of why you shouldn’t go to Iowa. He literally just had to say, well you have the resume for it I guess I’m just going to trust you.
Feld: I’m just puzzled really why he didn’t put his foot down. So, you came to him and said you were leaving.
Fowler: The first thing I said to him was the last thing I said to him was “you are a movement candidate, if anyone comes to you and tries to turn you into somebody that you’re not, turn you into a blue-suit politician you need to reject that.” That was literally the last conversation that we had. Part of never having run for office is you don’t have a political reference point. Campaigns at their best are controlled chaos. In the military, [they] slot people into pre-existing jobs, it’s not a startup. Campaigns are more like startups, you’re creating on the fly. [Clark had] been a general where everything is very formalized and structured and has been for 250 years. General Clark had no structure the day he announced, not even a check book. He was a 4-star general who had never been a politician.
Feld: Did he try to talk you out of leaving?
Fowler: Yeah, he did.
Feld: And you said it needs to be this way, and he said I can’t because these other people are telling me this.
Fowler: That’s, that’s…this is the most I’ve ever talked about that conversation. So yes, I’ll say that and kind of…
Feld: Stirling Newberry open letter sounded very similar to what you were saying earlier. What did you think about the letter. Stirling took a lot of heat, it was vicious. The reaction seemed over the top. Maybe he touched a raw nerve there, close to the truth?
Fowler: Some of the people who were running the communications operation are killers, and their first instinct is to kill.
Feld: Chris Lehane?
Fowler: Like I said, I’m not going to do names. If you want a killer, you go get a killer. There was an unnecessary outing of me in the press 2-3 days later. My commitment to Clark, to Eli, to Dick Sklar was that I wasn’t going to talk to the press unless leaks start coming out of the campaign trashing me, then I would defend myself. I wrote a letter and said this is the letter I’m going to release if you start doing “unnamed source in the Clark campaign.” Nothing happened in press for 24-48 hours, and then it all started coming out. I told them attacks were not going to go unanswered. I told them I was going to send the letter out and I did.
Feld: Was Stirling right about the bell tolling when you lost the battle for the soul of the campaign, that this would be a movement campaign, the campaign was over?
Fowler: Once the traditionalists got firm control over the budget, which is what it comes down to, and the schedule, and they did it in a few weeks after the announcement, that was the point of no return. Ultimately the candidate was responsible for the campaign.
Feld: Jim Webb said that the fish rots from the head down. Webb got mad. Clark never seemed to get mad.
Fowler: Not publicly. He’s a fighter, tenacious. You can see the military leader, the inspirer in him. He’s really amazing on the stump, giving a speech, leading the troops.
Feld: You don’t have to convince me. It was so depressing after you left, after Stirling’s letter, and I realized that it probably wasn’t going to happen for Clark. I thought Dean would win the nomination and get crushed by Bush. I still can’t believe it in a lot of ways.
Fowler: Clark had never run for office, he had no political reference point. He was coming from the military where everything is very structured, jumping into the inevitable chaos of the campaign…
Feld: Clark raised a lot of money in fourth quarter [of 2003], in the first month of the first quarter [of 2004]. The netroots didn’t totally abandon him. Clark was gaining in the polls in New Hampshire.
Fowler: It was his decision to skip Iowa. There’s no precedent when there’s an open field where you skip Iowa and are competitive. You can’t do it. You can’t do it…Especially if a U.S. Senator and union are going to endorse you.
Feld: What happened with the netroots “Operation Sodbuster” initiative for Clark in Iowa?
Fowler: There was a great Draft Clark group all around the state, it was phenomenal. It was extensive, it was everywhere.
Feld: What happened with that thing?
Fowler: The campaign said they weren’t going to play in Iowa, so everybody got demoralized and said fuck it.
Feld: What would the harm have been to let grassroots do what it wanted to do?
Fowler: Without the candidate, it couldn’t have worked. You demoralize your supporters by saying they don’t matter. You can’t elect a candidate without the candidate being there. That’s the problem with the three Draft Gore movements. There’s a huge amount of money and sentiment for Gore. But he’s not going to run for President.
Feld: Do you think the Webb campaign proved something or was it a fluke?
Fowler: At the risk of being critical of the netroots, there’s a sense in the netroots….lots of them are new to politics, the 2003/2004 campaign was their first real political experience. There’s a sense that there was no grassroots before the internet came along, that’s just a misunderstanding. The grasssroots has always existed. What technology has done has allowed us to do the most traditional politics much better and much faster. There’s nothing actually new. The netroots sometimes believes that they invented the grassroots, or some completely highly advanced super charged steroids-full grassroots.
Feld: I think it’s the latter.
Fowler: The underlying feeling that the Democratic Party never did grassroots before the netroots came along, that’s just not true. There were unions, the pro-choice movement, the [civil rights] movement, all of which predated the internet. The internet makes it all easier.
Feld: But it’s not just on the internet, it’s also Meetups…people meeting in person and establishing relationships, right?
Fowler: That’s exactly my point. You use the internet to do politics in the most old fashioned, traditional way.
Feld: Was the Webb campaign a fluke?
Fowler: No, the Webb campaign was an example of being able to sit back and look at the lessons of what worked and what didn’t in 2003/04.
Feld: What’s interesting is that several of people in the Webb campaign came out of the Clark movement - Larry Huynh, Jessica Vanden Berg, Brent Blackaby, Chris Ambrose, Debby Burroughs, myself. There were a number of people who came out of the Clark experience and then transferred it into the Webb experience a couple of years later.
[...]
Do you feel the same energy out there [this year as in 2003/2004]?
Fowler: It’s a different kind of energy. Dean’s was more poignant, passionate; Obama’s is bigger.
Feld: Is it the Facebook thing - broader but shallower? A mile wide and an inch deep, perhaps?
Fowler: [I'd say] “a mile wide and a foot deep.”
Feld: Who were strongest advocates and detractors of the Draft Clark movement?
Fowler: The strongest advocates were the draft movement leadership itself. [In addition], I count myself as a very very strong advocate for the grassroots movement. There were lots of political people in the mid-level staff that embraced the grassroots movement, they had worked in states, in grassroots themselves. People like Jessica Vanden Berg. Some in the communications team were believers in the movement, some weren’t. Clark was a believer in the movement, but when he was on the road he couldn’t do day-to-day details.
Feld: It’s sad, I still think Wesley Clark could have been president, should have been president.
Fowler: The key moment was when they decided not to play Iowa…
Feld: What if they had integrated the netroots into the campaign and let Clark be Clark?
Fowler: My metaphor is a wild, raging river. It’s a powerful thing but not really of any use to anyone - it can’t produce electricity, irrigate your crops…lots of potential energy. A grassroots movement that’s not directed or channeled can be as ineffective as no grassroots movement at all. Look at Howard Dean in Iowa.
Feld: A wild raging river can be destructive.
Fowler: Some people’s reaction [was to] shut the grassroots movement out of decision making. That’s just as bad a mistake, maybe even worse, than letting the river run wild. [Integrating the netroots] is what you did on the Webb campaign. It’s what the Clark campaign rejected and tried to damn the river, whereas the Dean campaign let the river run wild and it flooded. The question is, how do you use a powerful, organic grassroots movement?
Feld: Clark was an electable Howard Dean, with a perfect profile to beat Bush?
Fowler: Absolutely. That’s not a mistaken interpretation.